State of Utah v. John Holden : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. John Holden : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Janet C. Graham and Marian Decker; Attorney General\'s Office; Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellee.
Wesley M. Baden; Uintah County Legal Defender; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Holden, No. 970236 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/815
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 / ~ o ^ 
•A10
 n fcO^ 
DOCKET NO. 'llD'Z'lty-rA' V -
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
JOHN HOLDEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 970236-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge 
Janet C. Graham and Marian Decker 
Attorney General's Office 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854-0854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Wesley M. Baden 
Uintah County Legal Defender 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
418 East Main, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 537 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
FILi 
DEC 1 0 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN HOLDEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CaseNo.970236-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge 
Janet C. Graham and Marian Decker 
Attorney General's Office 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854-0854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Wesley M. Baden 
Uintah County Legal Defender 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
418 East Main, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 537 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE-
RELEVANT FACTS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OPEN VIEW DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO 
THIS CASE; EVEN ACTIVITIES EXPOSED TO 
PUBLIC VIEW OUTSIDE DEFENDANT'S HOME 
CANNOT BE VIDEOTAPED BY POLICE WITHOUT 
COURT AUTHORIZATION; VIDEOTAPING 
CONSTITUTED A SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
WITHOUT WARRANT OR EXIGENT CIRCUM-
STANCES; THE VIDEOTAPE OBTAINED FROM 
SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
1 
II. TWO OPAQUE SACKS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT 
ARE NOT GARBAGE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
STATE V. JACKSON, DECIDED LIS PENDENS, AND 
DEFENDANT HAD A PROTECTED PRIVACY 
INTEREST IN THE SACKS; IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE SACKS IS 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE; THE SACKS 
AND THEIR CONTENTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED 
ON EITHER GROUND. 
CONCLUSION 14 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment 3, 8 
Fourteenth Amendment 14 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, section 7 3 
Article I, section 14 3,12 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
RULES 
Rules 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 
FEDERAL CASES 
United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987) 7,10 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) 13 
UTAH CASES 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) 2 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 14 
State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App. 1997) ii, 7,12, 13 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), cert, denied, 
454 U.S. 1057(1981) 6,8,9,11 
i i i 
NON-UTAH CASES 
State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990) 12 
State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990) 12 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) 
V. 
JOHN HOLDEN, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
> Case No. 970236-CA 
> Priority No. 2 
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Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
John Holden, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals his conviction following 
conditional no contest pleas to one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, 
a second degree felony (enhanced), and one count of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, 
a third degree felony (enhanced). The Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to suppress a police videotape obtained 
from warrantless, surreptitious surveillance on his home by means of an unattended camera located 
inside a private home across the street? Standard of review: The court's denial presents a question 
of law, to be reviewed for correctness. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). 
Issue 2 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to suppress all evidence discovered in 
two bags seized by police subsequent to videotaping defendant taking the bags from a vehicle on his 
property and placing them near the street, on grounds that the evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree 
or in the alternative that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bags that police 
violated? Standard of review: The court's denial presents a question of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Anderson, supra. 
Issue 3 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to suppress all evidence discovered in 
the bags on separate grounds that police acted in bad faith and failed to preserve certain items of 
evidence in the bags, in particular mail and food cans and packaging material, that were potentially 
useful to defendant in his case? Standard of review: The court's denial presents a question of law, 
to be reviewed for correctness. State v. Anderson, supra. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 14, Utah Constitution 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State, in its Second Amended Information, charged defendant with six counts: (1) 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to a first 
degree felony), (2) possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to 
a first degree felony), (3) possession of paraphernalia on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to a class A 
misdemeanor), (4) possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, on October 23, 1995 
(enhanced to a first degree felony), (5) possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, on October 
23, 1995 (enhanced to a third degree felony), and (5) possession of paraphernalia on October 23, 
1995 (enhanced to a class A misdemeanor). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Preliminary hearing was held August 9, 1996. At that time, count six, possession of 
paraphernalia on October 22, 1995, was dismissed. Defendant was bound over on all other counts. 
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From facts adduced at preliminary hearing defendant subsequently moved the court to 
suppress certain evidence, specifically a police videotape obtained from surveillance on his home and 
all evidence found in two bags which defendant, while being videotaped, took from a vehicle on his 
property and placed near the street. Two arguments were raised with respect to the bags: that the 
contents of the bags are fruit of the poisonous tree, and that defendant had a privacy interest in the 
bags that police violated. The argument also was raised that evidence discovered in defendant's 
house on October 23, 1995, on the basis of a warrant issued after search of the bags, constitutes fruit 
of the poisonous tree. The trial court denied defendant's motion. More particularly, the court found 
that police did nothing illegal in videotaping defendant's home and they did not violate any privacy 
interest in the bags. The fruit of the poisonous tree argument regarding the bags was dealt with only 
implicitly. That is, because there is no poisonous tree (illegal police videotaping), there is no tainted 
fruit (evidence in the bags discovered from videotaping). The fruit of the poisonous tree argument 
regarding evidence found in defendant's home was really not dealt with at all. 
Believing the issues raised to be significant, defendant petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for 
permission to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order. On January 23, 1997 the court denied the 
petition. 
The case was set for trial. A month before trial, after repeated attempts to obtain full and 
complete discovery, defendant learned for the first time that police had failed to preserve certain 
evidence in the bags that would have been potentially useful to him. Defendant again moved the 
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court to suppress all evidence in the bags, this time on grounds that police violated his due process 
rights. A hearing was held March 14,1997 to take evidence and argue the issue, as well as consider 
miscellaneous pre-trial matters. At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. 
Later that same day, a plea agreement was entered into. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
Defendant pleaded no contest to two counts: (1) possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, on October 22, 1995 (enhanced to a second degree felony because of one 
previous drug-related offense), and (2) possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, on October 
23, 1995 (enhanced to a third degree felony because of two previous drug-related offenses). 
Defendant was sentenced respectively to one to fifteen years in prison and a $1,000 fine and zero to 
five years in prison and a $1,000 fine, the prison terms to run concurrently (though consecutively to 
a separate prison term he already was serving). Finally, defendant reserved the right to appeal the 
trial court's denial of suppression motions. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On the afternoon of October 20, 1995, while investigating suspected drug activity, two 
members of the Vernal City Police Department installed a video camera and recorder inside a private 
home across the street from defendant's home, so that they surreptitiously could record the activities 
of defendant and anyone visiting him. Videotaping lasted fifty-two hours, until October 22nd. 
Equipment was unattended except for two brief checks. Police neither applied for nor received court 
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authorization for installation of equipment. Preliminary Hearing Tr. 6-8, 29-32. 
While picking up equipment on the evening of October 22nd, and while it still was operating, 
police observed defendant exit his home, take two opaque bags out of a vehicle on his property and 
place them near the street. Police decided to seize the bags. They did not do so immediately but 
waited four hours, until 10:30 p.m. that night. They searched the bags at police headquarters. 
Incriminating evidence was discovered. The next day, October 23rd, police obtained a warrant to 
search defendant's home and promptly executed it. Still more incriminating evidence was found. 
Defendant was arrested and charged. Tr. 7-22. 
The search of the bags at police headquarters took just thirty minutes. Police separated 
"evidence" from what they considered to be 4itrash" and threw the latter away. Among items thrown 
away were mail supposedly addressed to defendant and food cans and packaging materials. 
Defendant, in discovery requests, had asked for disclosure of all physical evidence seized from him, 
but police did not inform defendant of their failure to preserve certain items in the bags taken from 
his home until just one month before scheduled trial. Hearing Tr. 11-26. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Regarding police videotaping of defendant's home, the State's reliance on the open view 
doctrine is misplaced. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981), 
which the State cites, can be distinguished factually from this case. Also, defendant in Lee arguably 
had much less constitutional protection than defendant here. Defendant, in this case, had an actual, 
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subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy against police videotaping of his activities of daily 
living including receiving guests at his front door and moving about in his yard. United States v. 
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987), which defendant cites, stands for the proposition that 
activities at defendant's home, even those exposed to public view outside, cannot be videotaped by 
police without prior court authorization. Police ignored constitutional safeguards set forth in Cuevas-
Sanchez and other federal cases cited in Appellant's Brief. Police videotaping constituted a search 
and seizure, without warrant or exigent circumstances. As a result, the videotape obtained from 
surveillance on defendant's home should be suppressed. 
Evidence obtained from two opaque sacks which police seized from defendant also should 
be suppressed, on two grounds. First, defendant had a protected privacy interest in the sacks. 
Unique facts and circumstances in this case distinguish it from State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah 
App. 1997), with the result that the sacks were not and now cannot be considered to be garbage 
subject to warrantless search. Secondly, and in the alternative, evidence from the sacks is fruit of the 
poisonous tree. The poisonous tree, in this case, is police videotaping of defendant's home. 
Evidence in the sacks, derived as it is from videotaping, is tainted. Attenuation analysis, with 
reference to the facts in this case, supports defendant's claim that the sacks and their contents should 
be suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE OPEN VIEW DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO 
THIS CASE; EVEN ACTIVITIES EXPOSED TO 
PUBLIC VIEW OUTSIDE DEFENDANT'S HOME 
CANNOT BE VIDEOTAPED BY POLICE WITHOUT 
COURT AUTHORIZATION; VIDEOTAPING 
CONSTITUTED A SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
WITHOUT WARRANT OR EXIGENT CIRCUM-
STANCES; THE VIDEOTAPE OBTAINED FROM 
SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State claims that there was no search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes because objects observed fell within the plain view of police. In support of its position the 
State cites State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981). 
However, Lee is inapposite. Lee involved a police officer who used a flashlight to look into 
the windows of a parked camper-truck and saw stolen items. In this case, what was observed was 
not a vehicle but a home. Also, no human officer made the observation, but rather a mechanical video 
device, running continuously for fifty-two hours, did so. Furthermore, observation did not occur on 
scene but from across the street, from inside a neighbor's home, some distance from defendant's 
property. Lee and this case are therefore factually distinguishable. Implications flow from the 
different fact-patterns. Arguably, defendant in Lee had much less constitutional protection than 
defendant in this case. Here, observation was on defendant's home, where, traditionally, there is a 
heightened privacy interest. To observe the home police used specialized equipment, which in and 
of itself always raises expectation of privacy questions. Indeed, even the court in Lee notes, "We 
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emphasize ... that we do not deal here with the use of electronic or other equipment designed to 
enable the user to invade areas where ... protection of privacy are to be reasonably expected." At 52. 
And of course there is the matter of where police put the video equipment in the first place, which 
has constitutional dimensions to it. 
The majority opinion in Lee stands for the proposition that "For an officer to look at what is 
in open view from a position lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a 
reasonable expectancy of privacy." At 51. In this case, however, police videotaping occurred in a 
place, the neighbor's home, where the public inherently did not have a right to be. The fact that 
police needed to obtain the neighbor's consent, prior to installation of the camera, reinforces the point 
that videotaping was from a non-public vantage point. For this reason alone, Lee should not be and 
is not controlling. 
Lee also is interesting in that there were two dissenting votes. The case itself was decided by 
the slimmest majority. Arguably, the dissent's call for development of analytical standards, as 
opposed to reliance on the simplicity and simple-mindedness of the open view doctrine, are relevant 
to this case. Defendant approves of numerous comments in the dissent, e.g., "Rather than 
approaching Fourth Amendment analysis from the perspective of the officer's position, this Court 
should focus its attention on the defendant's expectation of privacy in relation to the objects and 
activities in question and whether or not those expectations are reasonable. If we determine the 
defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to certain objects and activities, 
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we must then look to the activities of the law enforcement officers rather than the location of those 
officers to determine if the defendant's reasonably held privacy expectations have been encroached 
upon." At 54. 
In this case, defendant had an actual, subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy against 
police videotaping of his activities of daily living including receiving guests at his front door and 
moving about in his yard. Defendant would not have tolerated a human police officer standing on 
the street or sitting in a police car in front of his property, for a continuous period of fifty-two hours. 
He is offended that surveillance of his activities of daily living occurred by use of invasive, surrepti-
tious technology. 
The open view doctrine, in this context, must be circumscribed. It is in United States v. 
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987), where the facts were similar to the facts in this case. 
In Cuevas-Sanchez federal agents used a camera to record activities outside defendant's home. 
Defendant, like defendant here, was suspected of drug trafficking. Some of defendant's yard was 
fenced. However, there was no fence at all on the south, where the home faced, and there was a six-
foot metal fence on the east and a chain link fence on the west. Activities in the yard, therefore, were 
plainly visible from the street. There was an open view to anyone passing by and looking into the 
yard. This was also the situation at defendant's home in this case. That is, activities in his yard were 
plainly visible from the street. The court in Cuevas-Sanchez stated that even though activities in 
defendant's yard were open to public view defendant was entitled to protection in the form of court 
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authorization prior to video surveillance. At 250. Defendant, in this case, believes that he merits the 
same protection. 
At least with respect to police video surveillance of citizens' homes, including the exterior of 
the homes, the analytical framework wished for in Lee is supplied in the line of cases cited by 
defendant in the Brief of the Appellant. Prior to surveillance, police authorities must satisfy five 
requirements: (1) present a probable cause affidavit to the court where authorization for surveillance 
is sought, (2) obtain a warrant authorizing surveillance, specifying the place to be put under 
surveillance, etc., (3) ensure that the warrant states why conventional investigative techniques have 
failed or would be inappropriate, (4) utilize minimization techniques so that non-specified activity and 
non-specified persons are not intercepted, avoiding an impermissible general search, and (5) conduct 
surveillance for a time-limited period, not to exceed thirty days. Appellant's Br. 11. Defendant urges 
the Court to adopt identical procedural safeguards in this jurisdiction, as well as use them to 
determine whether citizens' constitutional rights have been violated through surreptitious police 
videotaping of homes. 
Because of citizens' expectation of privacy in and around homes, and the possibility, as in this 
case, of the use of invasive technology to observe citizens at home, prior court authorization should 
be required whenever police wish to videotape surreptitiously. In this case, police, disturbingly, did 
not recognize defendant's right to privacy and apply to a court for authorization to videotape him at 
home. A search and seizure occurred. This was without warrant, and without exigent circumstances. 
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Evidence obtained, specifically the police videotape, properly should be suppressed. 
II. TWO OPAQUE SACKS SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT 
ARE NOT GARGAGE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
STATE V. JACKSON, DECIDED LIS PENDENS, AND 
DEFENDANT HAD A PROTECTED PRIVACY 
INTEREST IN THE SACKS; IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE SACKS IS 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE; THE SACKS 
AND THEIR CONTENTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED 
ON EITHER GROUND. 
At the trial court level, in defendant's motion to suppress, defendant advanced arguments 
however succinctly for a privacy interest in garbage on purely state grounds. For example, defendant 
in his supporting memorandum cited State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990) and State v. 
Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990), both of which held that citizens retain a privacy interest in 
garbage ending only after garbage actually has been collected, and urged the trial court to interpret 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution broadly along similar lines. Defendant cited no Utah 
cases because, at the time of defendant's motion, no Utah appellate court had addressed the issue 
raised. 
It was not until ten days after defendant filed the notice of appeal in this case that the Court 
decided State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App. 1997). Jackson holds, for the first time in this 
jurisdiction, that article I, section 14 does not prohibit warrantless search of citizens' garbage left for 
curbside collection. At 549-50. Nonetheless, there are significant differences in the facts in Jackson 
and this case. In Jackson police searched what clearly were garbage cans. The cans were provided 
12 
by Provo City and had defendants' house number stenciled in white on them. In this case, there were 
no garbage cans or garbage containers at all. Police seized and searched opaque plastic sacks which 
defendant had taken from a pickup truck on his property and placed near the street. The sacks did 
not come from inside defendant's home. There was nothing to suggest that the sacks contained 
defendant's garbage or indeed garbage belonging to anyone. Because, from the outset of police 
action, there were no indicia that the opaque sacks contained garbage, Jackson should not be and is 
not controlling. There was warrantless search of defendant's property, not garbage, and it is 
irrelevant that the sacks turned out to contain garbage. "[A] search is not... made legal by what it 
turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success." 
United States v. Di Re, 322 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). 
In short, there are facts in this case to enable the Court to distinguish Jackson and hold on 
state grounds that defendant had a protected privacy interest in the sacks that police seized and 
searched. All evidence obtained from the sacks properly should be suppressed. 
The Court, in the alternative, should hold that evidence in the sacks clearly is fruit of the 
poisonous tree or remand this particular issue to the trial court. The trial court, in considering 
defendant's motion to suppress, did not expressly deal with the fruit of the poisonous tree argument 
because it determined that surreptitious videotaping by police did not violate defendant's rights, that, 
in other words, there was not a poisonous tree in the first place. 
Assuming, though, that the Court holds that police videotaping violated defendant's rights, 
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attenuation analysis supports suppression of derivative evidence obtained from the sacks. See the line 
of cases, beginning with State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), which defendant cites in 
Appellant's Br. at 17. Three factors determine the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of 
police misconduct: (1) the temporal proximity between the misconduct and subsequently discovered 
evidence, (2) the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct, and (3) the presence or absence of 
intervening circumstances. In this case, no significant time period passed between police videotaping 
and seizure of the sacks and discovery of their contents. Videotaping was deliberate and purposeful, 
flagrantly so. No events intervened between videotaping and taking of the sacks. The proper 
remedy, in this case, is for evidence in the sacks to be considered as fruit of the poisonous tree, and 
if necessary, suppressed on that independent ground. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant prays that the Court hold that the trial court erred in not suppressing the police 
videotape obtained from warrantless, surreptitious surveillance on his home as well as all evidence 
improperly discovered in the two sacks seized outside the home. Defendant prays also that the Court 
reverse defendant's conviction and remand his case for further proceedings by the trial court. Such 
proceedings, if necessary, should include determination of whether evidence in the sacks, derived 
from videotaping, is fruit of the poisonous tree. 
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